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to satisfaction of debts for which the property was liable during marriage pro-
vides support for permitting the wife (or husband) to share after divorce in
community assets which are not suitable for or capable of division at the time
of divorce.
The problem of characterizing interests in property as community or separate
is readily solved only when it is carefully isolated from the other problems usually
present in an action where characterization of property is required. The need for
division on divorce particularly complicates the problem of characterization. The
suggested three-step analysis consisting of: (1) determination of existence in the
sense of the Secondo case; (2) characterization based on the two principles which
control characterization; and (3) division, seems to clarify the problem. The
clarification results from breaking down the problem into the essential questions
which need to be answered by the courts. These questions, when segregated, are
readily answerable.
William E. Taggart, jr.*
* Member, Second Year Class.
CALIFORNIA SURFACE WATER LAW
California, because of its rapidly growing population and the resultant need
for increasing the number of living and business structures, appears to be a place
where surface water1 rights of neighboring landowners will come increasingly
into conflict. This development may be attributed to the urbanization of areas
which were once rural and the concomitant reshaping of the land's surface. Thus,
it is important to know what the Califorma law of surface waters is in order to
solve these conflicts.
Two Recent Cases
On April 13, 1965, Division One of the First District Court of Appeal handed
down the opinion of Keys v. Romley2 in which the court announced its adoption
of the "reasonable use" doctrine8 as it applies to surface waters in urban areas of
1 The surface waters referred to are sometimes called "causual surface waters"
and, according to Kinyon & McClure, Interferences With Surface Waters, 24 MIN. L.
REv. 891 n.1 (1940), such waters are generally "those occasional recurrent accumu-
lations of excess water from rams and melting snows which either stand in temporary
ponds and puddles or drain off across the countryside until they reach a drainway,
stream or lake, or are absorbed in the soil."
2233 A.C.A. 681, 43 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1965) (vacated).
8 A clear explanation of what is involved in the reasonable user doctrine also ap-
pears in Kinyon & McClure, supra note 1, at 904 (footnotes omitted)- "Each possessor
is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of Ins land, even though the flow of
surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others. He recurs liability
only when his harmful interference with the flow of surface water is unreasonable. The
issue of reasonableness or unreasonableness is a question of fact to be determined in
each case upon a consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including such factors
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California. Division Two of the Second District Court of Appeal, on September
8, 1965, decided the case of Pagliotti v. Acquistapace4 in which it was announced
that the law of California as to surface waters in urban, as well as in rural, areas
is the "civil law" doctrine. 5 Since the courts announcing these two divergent
doctrines are courts of equal jurisdiction, it is evident that there is some confusion
as to what is the California rule. The California Supreme Court has vacated both
opinions and heard arguments in both cases. Its pending decisions will no doubt
resolve this confusion.
In Keys, defendant, in improvmg hIs commercial property, raised the level
of his land and increased the flow of surface water, resulting from ram, onto
plaintiff's property. Plaintiff's lower estate was flooded and he sought damages.
In denying relief, the court stated that although the civil law rule generally pre-
vails in California, "with respect to the rights and liabilities of adjoining land-
owners regarding surface waters an exception to the civil law rule applies
with respect to urban land or property."6 The court then adopted the reason-
able use doctrine as announced in the Minnesota case of Enderson v. Kelehan.7
In Pagliotti, defendant erected an embankment to stop an increased flow of
surface water from plaintiffs upper estate. The court, in finding for defendant,
applied the civil law rule for urban, as well as for rural, areas, stating that "the
improong landowner, whether lower or upper, must bear the burden of disposing
of excess surface waters caused by his improvements."8
Confusion as to Californta Law
A seeming confusion as to the law of California is apparent from the groping
of the two courts to come to their respective decisions. In two instances, both
cases cite the same prior California decisions9 to support divergent surface water
doctrines. According to Pagliotti, Los Angeles Cemetery Assn v. City of Los
Angeleso applies the civil law doctrine to surface waters in urban areas, as it
was there pointed out that a lower owner is not liable in damages for the baclang
as the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of the harm on the part of the pos-
sessor making the alteration in the flow, the purpose or motive with which he acted,
and others."
4237 A.C.A. 29, 46 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1965) (vacated).
5 A good explanation of the civil law rule appears in Kinyon & McClure, supra
note 1, at 893 (footnotes omitted) "In substance, the civil law rule of surface waters
is that a person who interferes with the natural flow of surface waters so as to cause an
invasion of another's interests in the use and enjoyment of his land is subject to liability
to the other. Each parcel of land is said to be subject to a natural servitude for the
natural flow of surface water across it, and therefore a possessor of lower land is not
privileged to obstruct the natural flow of surface water from higher land, nor is a pos-
sessor of higher land privileged to increase the natural flow of surface water upon
lower land.'
6 233 A.C.A. at 685-86, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
7 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948).
8 237 A.C.A. at 37, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
9 Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 Pac. 375
(1894); Voight v. Southern Pacific Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 907, 15 Cal. Rptr. 59
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1961).
i1 Supra note 9.
up of surface waters onto the upper owner's land when such waters are a result
of an unprecedented storm. Keys views the holding in Los Angeles Cemetery
Ass'n as standing for an exception to the civil law doctrine as concerns surface
water in urban areas. The reference, however, in Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n
to an exception in urban areas1 is mere dictum.
This 1894 case dealt with the special rules regarding the liability of municipal
corporations in grading and improvmg streets within the city. In such a situation,
the court states that a municipal corporation is not bound to provide for the es-
cape of mere surface water, but that an exception to this non-liability exists where
the water has formed itself a definite channel in which it is accustomed to flow.
The city was held not liable, however, because the water in the water course was
swelled by an unprecedented and unforeseen storm. The court does not deal with
the liability arising from the alteration of the surface water flow and applies no
exception to the civil law rule, although it mentions the existence of such
exception.
"[T]he Vozght case [Voight v. Southern Pacific Co.],"12 according to Keys,
"although not specifically mentioning the 'reasonable use rule,' appears to gravitate
towards that principle."' 8 Although the reviewing court in Voight, at first sight,
does appear to gravitate towards the reasonable use rule, the holding, as Pagliotti
correctly points out,14 does no more than apply the civil law rule. The defendant
railroad in Voight maintained an embankment for its tracks and had provided
for natural surface runoff by constructing drains within the embankment. Many
years later, as part of the urbanization of the area, plaintiff developed the upper
land for business and residence purposes. The regrading and construction caused
an increase in the flow of surface water toward defendant's embankments, the
existing drains were unable to handle the increased flow, and, as a consequence,
the surface waters backed up onto plaintiffs land. The court, in following the
civil law rule in this action for damages, supported the defendant's right to refuse
acceptance of more than the natural surface water runoff:
Defendant operated its railroad for more than a half a century before the
development of the upper country increased the flow of surface waters. At
the time of its installation, it provided adequate drainage through its embank-
ment [lit seems rather shocking that in such a situation and after having
committed no wrong in the first instance, and having maintained the facility for
such a length of time, the plaintiffs who have built their homes with knowledge
of the situation, would be in a position to Unpose liability upon defendant.'5
If Voight did gravitate toward the reasonable use rule, as the Keys court said,
the upper landowners could increase the surface water flow and the lower owner
could not stop them if he suffered no great damage in having to accept a greater
amount of water. However, the Vozght court did not permit the alteration of the
"1 "The doctrine of the civil law, in reference to a servitude in the lower tenement
in favor of the upper and dominant tenement, for the flow of surface water, ha[s] no
application to lots held in the cities and towns." 103 Cal. at 467, 37 Pac. at 377.
12 194 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 907, 15 Cal. Rptr. 59 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los
Angeles, 1961).
18 233 A.C.A. at 689, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
14 237 A.C.A. at 36, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
15 194 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 910, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
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surface water flow and forced the upper proprietors to provide for a suitable
method of ridding themselves of the excess water. The court did not even look
into the reasonableness and the burdens involved.
Aside from the above cases,'8 the only other Califorma decision cited by
Keys as providing an exception to the civil law rule concerning urban areas, is
the 1873 decision of Ogburn v. Connor.17 The Ogburn case deals with the prob-
lems of surface water as between neighboring owners of land in a rural area.
The court applied the civil law rule and held the owner of the lower parcel of
land liable for obstructing the flow of surface water from the plaintiffs upper
land. The court does mention a reasonable use exception existing as to urban
areas-that as long as one does acts not inconsistent with the due exercise of
dominion of his own property, he is not liable for loss or detriment caused by
obstruction of surface water or by an alteration of its flow. But the problem here,
as in Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n, is that the reasonable use doctrine is mentioned
only by way of dictum. The case does not even lean in the direction of applying
the exception.
As demonstrated, the Keys court cites no California cases which truly support
its position that the California decisions are leaning toward the reasonable use
doctrine in urban areas. The only case cited by Keys that actually upholds the
reasonable use doctrine for application to surface waters is the Minnesota case
of Enderson v. Kelehan:18 "With respect to surface waters, Minnesota has evolved
the rule of reasonable use and follows neither the rule of the common law19 nor
that of the civil law."20 This is what the Keys court thinks the law of California
should be. But it cannot validly base its adoption of the reasonable use exception
on the existence of any trend in the Califorma cases, nor on Enderson because it
is merely persuasive authority.
Pagliotti Correctly Interprets the Law
Although the Keys court is incorrect in its interpretation of California law, the
Pagliotti court seems to have difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the
surface water law, applying equally to urban and rural areas in Califorma, is the
civil law doctnne.21 Notwithstanding thus seeming insecurity, the court rests its
1' Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 Pac. 375
(1894); Voight v. Southern Pacific Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 907, 15 Cal. Rptr. 59
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1961).
1746 Cal. 346 (1873).
18226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948).
19 This rule is otherwise known as the common enemy rule. An excellent statement
of the rule is given in 5 PoWELL, RnAL PROPERTY V 730, at 433-34 (1962)" "[Elach
landowner is entitled to regard surface water as an 'enemy,' and is entitled to treat this
enemy in the manner which reduces his injury to a minimum, without care for the
effects thereby caused to his neighbors."
20 226 Minn. at 167, 32 N.W 2d at 289.
21 The court, after coming to the conclusion that the decisions of the Califorma
courts support the view that the civil law is proper as concerns urban land, rests its
decision on the view that it is for the courts to place the burden for any change in the
surface water from its natural state on the person who is doing the developing of the
land because he is the one who will reap the benefits therefrom. 237 A.C.A. at 38, 46
Cal. Rptr. at 538.
NOTES
decision squarely on California case authorities, 22 two of winch are Voight and
Los Angeles Cemetery As'n discussed above.
Another case relied upon in Pagliotti was Heil v. Sawada,23 wherein defen-
dant, in building a large housing development, constructed a drainage ditch
which diverted the natural flow of surface water and discharged it onto plain-
tiff's property. The court, in holding defendant liable, quoted from Allen V.
Stowell:24 'To thus wrongfully cause water to flow upon another's land which
would not flow there naturally is to create a nuisance per se."25 Although it men-
tions nuisance, the Allen court grounds its decision on the familiar civil law rule
that to alter the natural course of surface water imposes liability. Also cited in
Pagliotti is Le Brun v. Richards.26 Here, the rights of an upper owner of property
to have the surface water naturally falling upon his land flow to lower ground
was protected against a lower owner who obstructed the path of the water. The
court held: "it is thoroughly settled in California that the owner of the upper or
dominant estate has a legal and natural easement or servitude in the lower or
servient estate to discharge all surface waters naturally falling or accumulating
on Is land "27
Two Categories of Surface Water Cases
The above cases cited in Pagliotti are in harmony with the other California
decisions in this area which, for convemence, may be placed into two categories
-(1) the protection of the lower estate owner from surface water flowing from
the upper tenement which exceeds the natural flow in amount and velocity and
(2) the protection of the upper owner from the lower owner's activities resulting
in an obstruction of the surface waters.
Protection of the Lower Owner
The development of property and the resultant change in the land's slope and
surface from grading and paving, results in water, which would normally have
been absorbed into the soil, running off according to the slope of the land onto
the neighboring lower tenement This type of land improvement has resulted in
extensive surface water rights litigation in which the courts, in protecting the
lower owner, have strictly applied the civil law doctrine.28
2 2 Le Brun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825 (1930); Armstrong v. Luco,
102 Cal. 272, 36 Pac. 674 (1894); Inns v. San Juan Unified School District, 222 CaL
App. 2d 174, 34 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1963); Heil v. Sawada, 187 Cal. App. 2d 633, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 61 (1960); Andrew Jergens Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. App. 2d 232,
229 P.2d 475 (1951); Jaxon v. Clapp, 45 Cal. App. 214, 187 Pac. 69 (1919); Voight
v. Southern Pacific Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 907, 15 Cal. Rptr. 59 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1961).
23 187 Cal. App. 2d 633, 10 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1960).
24 145 Cal. 666, 79 Pac. 371 (1905).
25 Id. at 669, 79 Pac. at 372.
26210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825 (1930).
27 Id. at 313, 291 Pac. at 827.
2 8 E.g., Allen v. Stowell, 145 Cal. 666, 79 Pac. 371 (1905); Armstrong v. Luco,
102 Cal. 272, 36 Pac. 674 (1894); Inns v. San Juan Unified School District, 222 Cal.
App. 2d 174, 34 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1963); Frustuck v. City of Fairfax, 212 Cal. App. 2d
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Armstrong v. Luco29 is an early California case protecting the lower owner,
which deals with the problem of surface water rights and liabilities in an urban
area. Here, the owner of an upper lot in San Francisco was negligent in allowing
his dram and sewer pipes to corrode and in permitting standing water to flow
onto the lower land of his neighbor. The court quotes with approval the mstruc-
tions given by the trial court to the jury-
The water upon each lot in a city, arising from ram, or from any cause originating
on the lot, such as a spring or cause of that kind, should be conducted by the
owner thereof, if he wishes to have it removed, directly from it to a sewer or
other place appropriate for the receipt and discharge of the same, and not to be
turned or led onto an adjoining lot without the consent of the owner.3 0
Although this is an early case, it very clearly gets to the heart of the problem of
water rights and their relationship to urbanization. The slightly more recent case
of Jaxon v. Clapp8' reinforces the decision in Armstrong. The upper owner here,
in addition to altering the grade of his land, which accelerated the flow of surface
water from is property, erected a wall leaving drainage holes which concen-
trated the flow of water onto plaintiffs land. The court found this upper owner
liable for the damage caused to the lower owner from such alteration of the
natural conditions.32
Protection of the Upper Owner
An examination of the second category of surface water cases shows that the
Califorma courts have consistently found a need to protect the upper owner from
the activities of the lower owner in developing his land. In regrading and erecting
structures upon his property, the lower owner can cause "damage" to the upper
proprietor. The damage results when such improvements serve to obstruct the
free and natural flow of surface water from higher to lower land which causes
the water to back up and flood the upper estate; this too is responsible for a great
345, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1960); Heil v. Sawada, 187 Cal. App. 2d 633, 10 Cal. Rptr. 61
(1960); People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Stowell, 139 Cal. App. 2d 728, 294
P.2d 474 (1956); Jaxon v. Clapp, 45 Cal. App. 214, 187 Pac. 69 (1919); Voight v.
Southern Pacific Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 907, 15 Cal. Pptr. 59 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. Los Angeles, 1961).29 Supra note 28.
30 102 Cal. at 274, 36 Pac. at 675.
8145 Cal. App. 214, 187 Pac. 69 (1919).
32 An example of the civil law doctrine as it is used to protect the lower proprietor
in rural areas is its strict application in People ex rel. Dep't. of Public Works v. Stowell,
139 Cal. App. 2d 128, 294 P.2d 474 (1956). Here, in regrading land as part of a flood
control project, the Department of Public Works altered the natural condition of the
land and directed surface water onto defendant's land, to where it had not flowed
naturally. Defendant erected a dike to protect his land from being inundated by these
new surface waters. The court, in this action to compel the removal of the dike, sus-
tained defendant's right to ward off surface water which was not a result of natural
conditions. It was forced to condone the use of self-help in order to sustain the civil
law doctrine; and the court thereby defeated the purpose of the needed flood control
project.
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deal of litigation in Californa.33 In Gonella v. City of Merced3 4 both defendant
railroad and defendant city inadequately maintained railroad embankments which
did not sufficiently provide for the flow of normal surface water run-off. As a con-
sequence, the storm water coming from plaintiffs land collected and backed up
onto his land. Defendants were held liable for the damage caused by the flooding
under the civil law doctrine laid down in Le Brun.
A recent use of the civil law doctrine for the protection of the upper owner
was made in the case of Andrew Jergens Co. v. City of Los Angeles.3 5 Here,
defendant constructed new streets but failed adequately to provide for surface
water run-off in its installation of underground culverts. As as result of heavy rams,
surface water was forced back, flooding plaintiff's land. To protect the upper
owner, the court granted an injunction against defendant, restraining any further
construction until a new and adequate method was found to take care of the
normal surface water run-off. The court ignored the doctrine of non-liability of
muicipal corporations for the obstruction of "mere" surface water, as announced
in Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n. Instead, it based its decision wholly on a strict
application of the civil law rule and refused to permit the needed development be-
cause it would cause some change in the natural surface water drainage. This
decision, in particular, portrays the true state of the law in California as regards
surface water. It appears that instead of becoming more leient as new construc-
tion increases, the courts are more strictly applying the civil law rule.
From the foregoing cases, it is apparent that Pagliotti correctly stated the
California law as to surface water rights and liabilities. The California courts have
consistently and strictly applied the civil law doctrine without any effort to miti-
gate its harsh effects, even though some cases hinted they would do so had the
facts been proper.3 6
Is the Civil Law Rule the Best One for California?
Although the civil law rule is the California law today, it does not mean that it
is the rule that should be, or that it is the best rule that could be, applied. The
civil law doctrine is justified by its supporters, including the reviewing court in Pa-
gliotti, on the basis that it is an objective standard of conauct and does not present
the difficulties in its applications that are presented by the reasonable use doctrine.
As the Pagliotti court states:
We have no quarrel with a rule of reasonable use insofar as it may apply to a
question of tort liability. However, as a rule of property law intended to regu-
late the relationslp of adjoining owners it would appear nothing more than an
33 E.g., Le Brun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825 (1930); Heier v. Krull,
160 Cal. 441, 117 Pac. 530 (1911); Ogburn v. Connor, 46 Cal. 346 (1873); Gonella
v. City of Merced, 153 Cal. App. 2d 44, 314 P.2d 124 (1957); Provident Irrigation
District v. Cecil, 126 Cal. App. 2d 13, 271 P.2d 157 (1954); Woo v. Martz, 110 Cal.
App. 2d 559, 243 P.2d 131 (1952); Andrew Jergens Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 103
Cal. App. 2d 232, 229 P.2d 475 (1951).
84 Supra note 33.
85103 Cal. App. 2d 232, 229 P.2d 475 (1951).
36 Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 Pac. 375
(1894); Ogbum v. Connor, 46 Cal. 346 (1873); Jaxon v. Clapp, 45 Cal. App. 214, 187
Pac. 69 (1919); Voight v. Southern Pacific Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 907, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 59 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1961).
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invitation to a lawsuit in the case of every dispute ansing over the disposition
of surface waters, for in the absence of any objective standards it is difficult to
see how adjoining property owners would ever agree upon what use was reason-
able. Known rights and known liabilities promote the stability and tranquility of
property.37
Although this desire to apply an objective standard is laudable, the civil law
rule fails to take into account that more than objective rules are necessary to
regulate society. It fails to provide for the equities which must be considered m
the urban setting where land space is at a premium and people are compelled to
live m close proximity to their neighbors. As Professor Powell has stated:
This approach [the reasonable user rule] permits the needed adjustment m the
conflicting interests of adjacent land owners, and represents the best approach
to the problems of surface waters. It has a bit of costliness in lack of predict-
ability, but it provides fairness in the required behavior of neighbors.S8
In addition to its not having an objective standard, the reasonable use rule, accord-
mg to the Pagliotti court, would present an "invitation to a lawsuit." It would
appear, however, that when a state follows a rule of law which finds liability for
any change in the surface water flow, that rule would provide more of an invita-
tion to lawsuits than one which permits some alteration of the surface configura-
tion, some change in the flow of surface waters which result, and some use of the
common sense approach of compromise between neighboring landowners.
Conclusion
The strict application of the civil law doctrine serves as a hindrance to the
needed growth and development of California urban areas. This growth and
development requires a good deal of construction. But, in the words of Professor
Powell, "Almost any construction, or any regrading alters the surface configuration
and can easily violate the requirements of this civil law handling of the problems
of surface water." 9 To overcome this conflict between the need for development
of the urban areas and the strict application of the civil law rule and permit the
state of Califorma to meet the requirements of its rapidly expanding population,
some modification of the civil law rule, at least as concerns the growing urban
areas of the state, is suggested. Other states following the civil law rule have
modified it for urban areas.40 As stated by the Maryland court in Kidwell v. Bay
Shore Development Corp.:41
[T]his Court has recognized that a strict and rigid adherence to the civil-law rule,
in some cases, works undue hardships upon one or more of the parties; and has
applied the reasonable-use doctrine. The application of this doctrine does not
change the adopted rule of law, but provides mitigation from harsh results which
may be reached by a strict application thereof.42
37 237 A.C.A. at 39, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 539-40.
38 5 PowEuL, ER.. PROPERTY 1 731 (1962).
89 Id. g 729, at 433.
40 Jobannsen v. Otto, 225 Iowa 976, 282 N.W 334 (1938); Bolinger v. Murray, 18
La. App. 158, 137 So. 761 (1931); Kidwell v. Bay Shore Development Corp., 232 Md.
577, 194 A.2d 809 (1963); Wellman v. Kelley, 197 Ore. 553, 252 P.2d 816 (1953).
41 Supra note 40.
42 232 Md. at 583, 194 A.2d at 812.
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A willingness to use the reasonable use doctrine has also occurred in states
professing to follow the common enemy (common law) approach to surface water
rights.43 With the common enemy approach, which is diametrically opposed to
the civil law rule but equally as harsh in its results, any alteration or diversion
of the natural flow of surface water is permitted. An example of a court's modifica-
tion of the common enemy doctrine may be seen in Hodges Manor Corp. v. May-
flower Park Corp.44 Here, it was held that the property owner may not exercise
this right to nd himself of surface water in a wanton or careless manner. Instead,
he must be guided by the rule that one is to use his own property so that he does
not injure the rights or property of another.
The need for the reasonable use doctrine where either the civil law or the
common enemy doctrine was followed was recognized in the foregoing cases in
states which were not so greatly in need of modification of these strict rules of
law mn urban areas as is California. But, until Keys, California courts have stub-
bornly adhered to the strict application of the civil law rule.
Thus, to complete the comparison of the divergent cases of Keys and Pagliotti,
it may be said that, in the final analysis, there was confusion as to the law in
Califoria in the minds of the two District Courts of Appeal. One court-Pagliotti
-was stating what the Califorma law is and what it has been, while the second
court-Keys--thought that it was interpreting an existing trend in the California
law.
Although it did not base its decision on California authority, the Keys court
recognized the equities involved mn surface water rights and liabilities and at-
tempted at least to modify the civil law rule in its application to urban areas by
adopting the reasonable use rule. It may be hoped that the California Supreme
Court will adopt this view and accept the reasonable use rule for urban areas. 45
Irwin M. Goldman*
43 Reutner v. Vouga, 367 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. App. 1963); Clark v. City of Springfield,
241 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. App. 1951); Turnell v. Mahlin, 171 Neb. 513, 106 N.W.2d 693
(1960); Hodges Manor Corp. v. Mayflower Park Corp., 197 Va. 344, 89 S.E.2d 59
(1955).
44 Ibid.
45 As this issue was going to press, the California Supreme Court handed down its
opinions in the Keys and Pagliotti cases, and adopted the reasonable use nile. Keys v.
Romley, S.F No. 21556, April 11, 1966; Pagliotti v. Acquistapace, L.A. No. 27867,
April 11, 1966.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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